New Media & Society Blog - y39

The cavalier attitude people have towards privacy online never ceases to astound me. I do things like buy clothing and use GMail--but the idea of having a profile openly accessible with my name, address, and interests is horrifying. To have that profile hosted by a vendor--Facebook--that's 'privacy' policy explicitly states the abuses it plans to undertake? Anathema. But, apparently, I am in the distinct minority in holding this perspective.

To me, the fear over online privacy is much more salient than the Myspace-save-our-children pitch offered by Verini. Yes, there are prurient pursuits percolating throughout Myspace--but the raunch levels that are accessible there truly pale in comparison to even what HBO carries. Even non-premium cable channels (FX) broadcast more flesh than is revealed on Myspace. And, though this article focuses on several examples of wild, exhibitionist sexual activity 'spurred' by Myspace it is my opinion that this is essentially aberrant and misleading. Thinking back to the readings we explored about Columbine last week, the outrage over Myspace is simply another in a long line of comic, movie, and Marilyn Manson freak-outs. If he's still writing on this topic today, Jenkins would certainly think the same thing. There will also be extremists; is Myspace really leading to a more sexualized environment? Is Myspace really driving its users to a new era of promiscuity? Or has media coverage simply zeroed in on the most salacious tidbits in its stories?

Meanwhile, it is the mundane activities of the 'normal' people that we overlook--though Rupert Murdoch and the NSA seem plenty interested in these folks. The slew of identifiable, categorical, digestible information shared on social networks websites is overwhelming. And, combined with the databases of consumer behavior that already exist (never mind other databases tracking things like healthcare and insurance), marketers are suddenly able to match individual names with faces. If the Pentagon already has 32 million profiles on young Americans, it now knows what they look like (broad shoulders for good soldiers?) and what songs they like--all the better to recruit with. Viewed en masse, this data is incredibly valuable--and it takes an institution with relatively robust resources to leverage it into a productive outcome. Individuals, of course, don't have the time, energy, or motivation to collect and collate these data points--and why would they? Is it possible for individuals to understand the worth of their own data to large institutions given the fact that similar data is of only marginal value/utility to them? From another perspective: will individuals value their information more once it is clear that institutions value it? Has this reality not become clear to the masses yet?

One sidenote from the Gross reading: I had no idea is was so easy to recreate social security numbers. I realized that there was some logic, based in geography and birth year, to the numbers--but I'm sort of horrified that it is very conceivable that a particular SSN can be re-engineered from easily accessible data. At what point will the government respond to this? How costly will any kind of adjustment to our current SSN system be?

1. There will also be extremists; is Myspace really leading to a more sexualized environment? Is Myspace really driving its users to a new era of promiscuity? Or has media coverage simply zeroed in on the most salacious tidbits in its stories?

2. Is it possible for individuals to understand the worth of their own data to large institutions given the fact that similar data is of only marginal value/utility to them? From another perspective: will individuals value their information more once it is clear that institutions value it? Has this reality not become clear to the masses yet?

3. At what point will the government respond to this? How costly will any kind of adjustment to our current SSN system be?

PS. Is 'danah boyd' the new e.e. cummings? Or is she the new bell hooks? What's with imposing your views on capitalization on the rest of the world?

Ah! I'm back, from a weekend of texting-underneath-the-Thanksgiving-table...

To some extent, the development of a body of video-game literature has been surprisingly slow. After all, by the mid-80s Nintendos were a fixture in households across the developed world, probably dominating more time than any influence in a child's life besides her parents or teachers. (OK--regular old TV was probably in the mix too.) At any rate, videogame research has matured with the Millenials, and this week's readings show a fecund ferment rich with opportunities for follow-up. The articles run the gamut from hard-core quant, media-effects research (Anderson&Dill) to qualitative, cultural-studies influenced research (Jenkins) with a number of articles that take tentative steps away from these ideological poles and towards the middleground that videogame players actually occupy (the Vorderer chapters and Williams' piece).

The Anderson&Dill article is the most traditional, violence media-effects study--and when paired with the other pieces this week it almost takes on the role of strawman. In its two studies, measurement of psychological factors and reaction times form the basis for an argument that exposure to violent videogames stimulates violent feelings or urges. Like cultivation and other TV-violence research, it seems likely that the pattern of adrenaline-induced tension is real. And, as with cultivation and other TV-research, any number of conceptual and methodological complaints can be made. For example, the convenience sample of undergrads is flawed, the researchers evince clear bias in their approach (see the kvetching about a participant classifying mortal kombat--a martial arts simulator of sorts--as a sports game on p.779), and, as Jenkins points out, all such research depends on acceptance of a slew of significant leaps of faith to connect the 'effect measure' to reality. In spite of these complaints, let's consider for a moment what the point of this sort of research is: if we accept that there is evidence of deleterious impacts from violent video games, then distribution (if not production) of such games should be limited. To do this, we depend on some kind of voluntary regulatory regime 'cause any other legal approach violates free speech. In addition, we hope that--if the consequences are serious enough--parents will step up and prevent their children from exposure for the good of themselves and others. At this point, I am willing to accept the sort of low-level negative impacts offered by Anderson&Dill; I'll concede this point. Even call it fact. But, in return, I have a favor to ask: until quantitative studies like this can show anything more serious and direct than an uptick in some esoteric laboratory aggression measure, let's ban their publication in refereed journals. Two reasons: 1. these studies are too easy to replicate without pushing towards new insight--wasting researchers time & resources 2. nothing new is proven, and no new actions are taken to regulate, shape games--so what's the point? So, having pursued this rant to a logical, and I dare-say relatively non-pejorative end, I challenge the quant sympathizers out there to justify further laboratory video-game violence media effects studies. [Even] If we accept the worst conclusions of Anderson & Dill's piece, is there any reason to ever do another quantitative media-effects videogame violence study?

The articles in Vorderer & Bryant's book offer a wide range of theoretical ponderings that could infuse future video game research. One such piece that starts to move towards a more complex assessment of gaming is Williams' exploration of Asheron's Call. This piece sets out to explore the relationship between massive-multiplayer online gaming and social capital and begins with an excellent lit review to set the scene for some unique, innovative research. Basically, Williams pursues a design that creates an experiment with an N of ~375 and includes a month of game-play in a natural setting. There are flaws with the method--no control--but it is ambitious and unique. Unfortunately, the game Asheron's Call is used--a bizarre choice apparently driven solely by Microsoft's willingness to donate copies of the [bomb] game. Williams ends up finding several negative effects of playing AC--but he cannot even evaluate whether or not there may have been positive social effects of MMOG because the game doesn't offer enough social opportunity. Unfortunately, this truly skews the outcome of the research--leaving a clear need for follow-up work that uses a more popular game. Jenkins, in his exploration of the relationship between Columbine shootings and media, suggests that a primary cause of the attack was an inability to escape negative social relationships in one's own immediate environment. His first point of future work at the end highlights a website designed specifically to facillitate community for ostracized kids--a project with a golden aim but an unwieldy approach. MMOG could offer precisely this kind of community--an incredibly beneficial effect of gaming--but Williams couldn't evaluate this potential...If solace for the ostracized was offered by MMOG, would this benefit outweigh the negatives shown in Williams' study?

1. [Even] If we accept the worst conclusions of Anderson & Dill's piece, is there any reason to ever do another quantitative media-effects videogame violence study?

2. If solace for the ostracized was offered by MMOG, would this benefit outweigh the negatives shown in Williams' study? What other potential benefits were left unexplored by Williams?

3. Are new media experiences too idiosyncratic for 'generalizable' research? If so, is Jenkins' approach of exploring specific social and cultural contexts ideal or is there some other paradigm that should be applied?

This week’s readings on surveillance cued a long-lost Gandy reminiscence on my behalf. Basically, after taking several courses with Gandy—reading about datamining, surveillance, and privacy—I feel generally sympathetic to privacy advocates like EPIC. In fact, I have even published on the potential iniquity of the digital age, in which large institutions clearly have an advantage in that they have the ability to cull through vast stores of data that individuals can only generate and dream of analyzing. Yet, I wonder whether resistance is futile. Koskela and Curry et. al both describe how cities and public spaces change because of new surveillance technologies. I guess my broad question is: can (or will) this descriptive work have any tangible outcome? In theory, yes, public outrage can thwart things like the installation of ‘public safety’ security cameras—but take a look around Penn’s campus. There are literally dozens of cameras that are the proudest feature of Penn Safety. Just last week I got a tour of the monitoring facility. When you consider privacy concerns in contrast to (the very real) safety concerns in West Philadelphia, is it any surprise that the cameras are everywhere? Aside from being developing scholars, as citizens what is your balancing equation on privacy versus surveillance in public spaces?
Lyon touches on an interesting tension: in the city, some surveillance is positive—but apparently too much is negative. The Curry article begins to detail how digital systems render spaces quantifiably visible; the Koskela piece discusses the emotional outcomes of this process. In these articles, it is clear that CCTV, cell phones, and other digital technologies are expeditiously pushing public space into a recorded, databased age. Short of reversing time, it really doesn’t appear that these technologies are going to disappear. As Lyon, Curry and the rest explore the consequences, it seems that agitating for a rollback of modern technologies is futile. Instead, legal mechanisms to protect public (and private) activities seem to be the most appropriate avenue. That said, developing statutes and codes that accomplish this is a challenging task. While ‘the right to be left alone’ may be an enduring standard in terms of privacy, there is no similar koan that describes the value of freedom in public space. How should legal protection for actions in public space be phrased/construed/developed?
Finally, two of our articles this week touch on the relationship between surveillance and the corporate sector. First, we have a piece that describes a Disney-branded cellphone that takes advantage of mobile technology to overtly track children for parents. Second, a Wired article discusses how data-gathering technologies can be used against centralized powers. Each article makes its point—I mean, these are short pieces of journalism that are describing singular events. Judging the situation on these two pieces, it seems as if equal footing exists between companies and individuals: even if Disney can market a phone to track your children (while having the wherewithal to database your ownership) you can walk into their theme parks and capture their IP or their characters misbehaving (an incident that happened much to Disney’s chagrin) while in costume. Yet, while people make catch photos of misbehavior and post them to the blogosphere, Disney can cry IP abuse and force cease-and-desist actions. Meanwhile, consumers that want cell phones sacrifice any right to locational invisibility by simply acquiring a phone. Why haven’t any mechanisms been developed to limit access to cellular geodemographic (and other) data? Will groups like EPIC or individuals be able to combat large institutional forces that oppose them?

1. When you consider privacy concerns in contrast to (the very real) safety concerns in West Philadelphia, is it any surprise that the cameras are everywhere? Aside from being developing scholars, as citizens what is your balancing equation on privacy versus surveillance in public spaces?

2. How should legal protection for actions in public space be phrased/construed/developed?

3. Why haven’t any mechanisms been developed to limit access to cellular geodemographic (and other) data? Will groups like EPIC or individuals be able to combat large institutional forces that oppose them?

Ostensibly, our readings focus on children and new media this week—but the most interesting thread is the role of social context in dictating the use and influence of these technologies. In the Jackson et. al project, predominantly poor African Americans were given access to the internet in their homes and studied for sixteen months. In Japan, Ito and Okabe explored youth usage of mobile phones for text messaging. And, in Israel, Mesch and Talmud explore the nature and quality of social relationships online and off. Thus far, we have already explored the technologies at stake in these articles; what stands out this week are the different utilizations across cultures.

In the Jackson piece, the basic findings is that, even after providing access to the internet in the home, usage is low and the impact not pronounced. The researchers’ explanation for this is that, without context, the participants simply did not have use for the internet. If communication is the primary driver of use, the participants were from a segment of society that, by-and-large, was not online and, consequently, they had nobody to communicate with online. In addition, other common tasks—like online banking or shopping—may have been less attractive to the participants because they simply did not have the money. Other outcomes—social, psychological, and cognitive—were minimized by low-usage. (The researchers suggest that there were significant cognitive impacts—that high users had better GPAs than low users—but I got a little lost in the path model and couldn’t figure out whether GPA at outset was controlled for…) Kids in Israel, on the other hand, are steeped enough in internet use that Mesch & Talmud could effectively compare the strength of their online and offline relationships. (The most amazing part of this study was the response rate: just about 99%!) In a way, the findings kind of echo Jacksons: compared to offline interaction, online interaction is simply too new/limited to be an equal. Yet, it is simply a given that these children are online and are making new relationships in this space.

The Ito and Okabe article discusses the specifics of a technologies use in a particular culture. They explore the ways in which Japanese youth are able to escape parental/societal surveillance and interact via text messages. Many facets of the society itself drive the usage: the prevalence of small homes, the possibility of living at home during and even after college, and fairly regimented work, school, and public spaces. In addition, care not to disturb others is a cultural value expressed in many nuances of mobile phone usage in Japan. Respondents report texting instead of calling on public transit, texting friends to verify availability before calling, and even texting in the home as a way to mollify co-present parents. Essentially, all of the circumstances add up to a perfect environment for texting to flourish—and it clearly has. To a lesser extent, many of the same motivators exist in other societies—and it seems that texting is less common as well.

1. Was the academic finding in the Jackson et. al study real?

3. Back to the digital divide: will municipal wifi and $100 computers eventually breakdown the segmentation problem that Jackson et al ran into? Are there other forces at work besides affordability? (We discussed the presence of interesting content before…)

This week we've picked up more early mobile and public-internet use articles. The researchers here are doing us a favor: instead of waiting for Carolyn Marvin to come along a couple hundred years later and explore the new technologies retrospectively, we've got people doing it concurrently now. Already, much of this work shows its age. Our researchers talk about the Usenet, internet cafes, and unfamiliarity with mobile phones. Certainly these issues/objects still exist...but lots has changed.

In the context of third places, I have several thoughts. First, I think much of the concern explored by Ling about mobile phones is moot these days. Some of this is because of technological advances--vibrate, ear pieces--and some of it is through acclimation. There are still awkward moments--but they really are fewer and farther between these days, even though mobile phones are increasingly ubiquitous. People know when to switch the phone to vibrate, reject a call, or step outside. Those of us not receiving calls have gotten used to biding our time. As for internet use in cafes: the Hampton piece gave a much finer overview of the phenomenon than Lee's--benefiting from the later date & a brawnier methodology. (The two don't quite share the same target--coffee cafes vs. internet cafe--but given the passage of time they are close.) I feel like these two articles gave us a solid perspective of how people interact with each other while using the internet in public; I also feel like they are just touching on what will happen as internet use goes into our pockets and hands across cities...

The Whyte video we saw suggested that most people in public spaces aren't talking to new people--they're just enjoying copresence. It seems to me that the rise of TV probably was the real killer for public space--suddenly, there was a very attractive alternative to people watching and it the two were actually mutually-exclusive. Mobile technology, on the other hand, seems like a boon to utilizations of public space. Instead of being tethered to my home phone, I'll chat in the park with far-flung relatives. Instead of sitting watching the TV in my bedroom, I'll surf the net in Rittenhouse. If the desired outcome of being in public spaces is collective action (which is very far from what Whyte observed), it is certainly conceivable that adding layers of communication media will encourage conversations that lead to action. To some extent, people may be cocooned in their own, mobile bubbles--but these bubbles will at least bump into each other instead of being neatly tucked away inside the oikos.

Which brings me back to third spaces. One of the sidebars from the textbook blurb on third-spaces talked about the growing commercialization of traditional examples like cafes and bars. In the old version, these spaces were convivial because people from all walks of life could gather and interact--in no small way facilitated by the employees. As these businesses become corporatized, they also mirror the increasing stratification in society: why would a patron talk to a lowly barista? Immediately, the entire dynamic changes and there is a poisonous element in the air. If third spaces like this are dying, perhaps public spaces will become even more integral as they assume some of the social roles previously served by bars etc.

1. Are mobile communication technologies good for public spaces? Do they reverse a trend of disintegration triggered by the rise of earlier, home-based electronic media?

3. What other spaces will be/are reshaped by internet penetration? Airports? Public-transit? Waiting rooms? Are we going to bemoan the destruction of these spaces too?

Some media have always been portable—newspapers, books, and magazines, for example. Some media have always been amenable to being partnered with other interactions—television for example. The readings this week deal with portable media that are integrated into other interactions in public. Though the introduction of radio into public spaces seems in some ways like a natural precursor to this conversation—as a cellphone ring interrupts so does a ghetto blaster on the streets of NYC in 1986—the literature on cellphones in public reaches farther back to Goffman and his work on interpersonal interactions. The general finding is that cellphones are an incursion into public space, disrupting established patterns of interpersonal interaction.

Ling and Humphreys have written remarkably similar articles on cellphones in public settings. They both use ethnographic methods and use Goffman as a foundational element of their research but there are important differences. Most notably, Ling intentionally violates personal space in his observations to gauge reactions while Humphreys supplants observation with interviews. Ultimately, they have complementary findings: people are discomfitted by the use of cellphones in the midst of small-group interactions and by people in public settings in general. There are signs of adaptation to this new reality, however. People are developing activities or habits to defuse their tension, communication non-verbals to allay it, and technologies so that phone use causes less of it. To me, it seems like this is largely a transitional period, and that the unease we feel today will ebb as time passes.

Last night, I was reading about the Sony Mylo—My Life Online—a Sidekick-like gadget that functions on wifi networks. This device would allow individuals to IM, email, share music, and use the web with a dedicated, handheld device. It would, in a pinch, also work as a telephone by using Skype—though it is not designed primarily to be a phone. It ocurred to me that as devices like this mature—and apparently this one has several critical shortcomings—the gaps that develop when face-to-face interactions are interrupted will be easily and productively filled. In addition, devices like these will truly exploit the wifi commons that Sandvig discusses. Sandvig’s article, from 2004, discusses the primitive rise of wifi clouds and coops. Though coop networks—and the anarchist or outlaw mentality inherent to them—are not a wide part of life, municipal, campus, and random hotspots are prevalent today.

The merger of today’s cellphone ubiquity with the richness of computing over wifi networks is a fascinating research opportunity. Devices like the Mylo will soon be in the pockets and hands of people all across the world, in classrooms, offices, parks, and buses. Not only will people be able to kill time while their friends are on the phone, they’ll be able to factcheck politicians in real-time and develop pointed queries. They will be able to cheat perfectly on exams, solve any conversational quandary by Googling, and have a mobile dictionary for Scrabble in the park. Not only does this shift implicate social habits and patterns, it dramatically reshapes power dynamics. No conversational assertion is ever safe, no matter what expertise or authority an individual may possess. What we see from researchers like Ling and Humphreys is only the beginning of a wide remapping of social patterns as mobile technology is integrated into a range of interactions.

1. When we comfortably integrate ICTs into our daily face-to-face interactions, what will be lost?

3. Is public space truly violated by the introduction of private business? Haven't private concerns always spilled into public view, and, is it really that big a deal if someone is having a cellphone conversation next to you on the bus? How is this different from two people physically present chatting? Do iPods solve this problem anyways? Isn't the idea of public space that it's actively reserved for whatever uses individuals and groups see fit?

Earlier today, I forgot to print out a reminder for a party that I’m having tomorrow. See, I’d emailed the reminder to all the students at Annenberg & to my other (mostly Penn-related) friends—but I wanted to tape it to my neighbors’ doors so that they’d know I was having a party, maybe stop by, and, most importantly, not call the cops. In my 4th year in the same apartment, I know none of my neighbors. I don’t have their email addresses, I don’t know their names or faces, and I’m certainly not going to knock on their doors.

The idea of neighboring—borrowing a cup of sugar or a stick of margarine—is bizarre to me. In the Hampton articles (and beyond), it’s written about with a halcyon tone: in the distant past, before the dawn of modernity, people near each other talked to one another. As Hampton&Wellman point out, these concerns echo those offered by Tonnies 120 years ago; one difference that occurs to me is the populations affected by the structural changes seen to be at the root of these respect social breakdowns. In Tonnies gemeinschaft/geselleschaft, industrialization drives an urbanization of peasants. Thus, the bonds are broken first among the poor. In modern times, the change is wrought by ICTs—fairly expensive, non-necessary purchases. Though a divide may develop between the ICT haves and have-nots, the decline in social connection that we’re discussing today emanates from the opposite end of the economic spectrum.

In reading the “Narrowing the Digital Divide” article, I started wondering what neighboring was like among communities that are not permeated with ICTs. Netville and the locales discussed in the follow-up Hampton article are clearly not lower socio-economic situations; the Ball-Rokeach article does include different ethnicity and income groups but only in a very narrowly focused analysis. According to the logistic regression results, being poor does have a negative effect on making friends online—presumably because of digital divide obstacles. Strangely, very, very little is said in this article about internet use or even internet access. In the course of a 45 minute telephone interview, I assume these questions were asked—but they are not included in the analysis. At any rate, there seem to be many fruitful questions to ask about neighboring: how does accessing ICTs at community technology centers affect neighboring? What does neighboring look like within poorer communities today? Are there meaningful insights to be drawn from a comparison of neighboring within poor and wealthy communities instead of across types of wealthy communities?

Another question is whether neighboring is necessary anymore. Since interest-based social interactions are clearly better served by matches made by interest not immediate location, the best rationale for neighboring that I see probably revolve around either Putnam’s pleas for social-capital or a Jane Jacobs eyes-in-the-city perspective (both of which are invoked in the Hampton&Wellman piece). A true believer in the internet and markets might suggest that these notions are antiquated. Why cultivate social capital—useful for solving small problems like hiring a baby-sitter or fixing a drain—when craigslist and online rating systems can easily and effectively fill the same needs? A similar, wisdom-of-the-crowds, approach might be taken to the Jacobs view as well. The street isn’t safe because you know the store-keeper that’s watching it, it’s safe merely because he’s there, watching it. Jacobs herself writes about the role strangers play in this interaction; isn’t the necessity of a personal relationship even lower today? To take this approach demands a surfeit of faith in the functioning of markets and institutions. I’d like to think that, were my building to burn down, a neighbor would be concerned if I didn’t emerge downstairs—but will they even notice if I don’t invite them to my party?

1. What does neighboring look like within poorer communities today?

2. Are there meaningful insights to be drawn from a comparison of neighboring within poor and wealthy communities instead of across types of wealthy communities?

3. Is social capital necessary? If it's not necessary, how useful or important is it? Can somebody make an effective case for me--'cause I'm skeptical and don't like just being told that it is because it is...

4. Is it cool to live in the basement in Canada? My parents' house in BC has a basement suite too; I just feel like I need a window or something...

Succinctly, this week’s readings focus on the manner in which information technologies reshape daily life and the activities and contacts that comprise it. Several different tactics are taken in this assessment: Robinson brings his time-budget method to bear, Quan-Hasse et. al use data from a large web survey, and Haythornthwaite brings a structural perspective to the dialog. This week is one that recenters expectations of IT, bringing a calmer approach to the assessment of new technologies’ influence. After initial research, clear evidence of stark transformations wrought by IT simply has simply not been isolated. Instead, the role IT has in reshaping the patterns of modern life are more nuanced and must be understood as supplementary not revolutionary.

The Quan-Hasse and Haythornthwaite pieces appear to emerge from the same incubator: Barry Wellman. (I could be wrong here; if the tie isn’t direct, however, it still seems very strong.) These are social network articles, and the questions posed essentially revolve around the ways that IT reconfigure social networks. Quan-Hasse finds many intuitive results that, when taken together, suggest that people have added IT to their communication toolbox and use it when appropriate but are not developing wholly new patterns of socializing or engaging with civic/political issues. (As a sidenote, I looked the other day to see if there were meetups forming yet for any of the Philly mayoral candidates. Not only were there none formed around the mayoral campaign, there were basically no politically-oriented meetups for all of Philadelphia. Grassroots organizing revolutionized? It seems not…) The findings in the Quan-Hasse piece are all very believable—even though they are spawned by a web-based survey from National Geographic’s website.

Similarly, the Haythornthwaite (is there a missing hyphen or something?) article basically makes this argument: the medium is the tie—at least in terms of weak ties. She qualifies a bit so that it’s isn’t quite 100% deterministic, but her point holds: listservs (or other media) constitute the weak or latent ties themselves and, if for some reason, the listserv is killed so is the tie. Strong ties are marked by path redundancy, which both prevents elimination and acts as a characteristic for us to identify/distinguish weak/strong ties. Academic listservs seem to be an ideal example of her thesis: a group of individuals share a common space, see each other interacting from a distance, and, given the right stimuli, may connect directly. Take away the interactive space, and the relationship collapses. Except that I disagree. It’s not the medium, in my opinion, that sustains weak ties like this—it’s the commonality that makes the medium (listserv) mutually relevant. Even without the listserv, as a scholar I’ll have a vague idea (aka weak tie) that a colleague exists based on conferences, publications, or shared contacts. This redundancy is characteristic of strong ties in Haythornthwaite’s scheme—yet it seems like weak ties may have latent redundancy as well.

In two articles, Robinson bring time-budget data in to discuss how internet use reshapes daily life. Basically, he finds very little—and suggests that IT is nowhere near as revolutionary as TV. I think this comparison and conclusion is misleading; it may be true that the internet has caused a less dramatic shift in life patterns but the context of the comparison is important as well. The Robinson TV studies begin with data from the mid-1960s—twenty years after television was launched in America. The internet data was collected about 5 years after the launch of the WWW in the US. Television entered a home-media atmosphere that was barren compared to the environment internet was met by. Additionally, there are very few jobs that integrate TV in a fundamental way; the internet, in comparison, is a vital element of the workplace. Essentially, direct comparisons should not be made. Ultimately, Robinson etc. arrive at very similar conclusions to Quan-Hasse and the Wellman camp: the internet is a part of life, but it’s not earth-shattering.

In a way, it seems like these readings echo the minimal effects period of mass-communication research. Having started out with Rheingold’s hypodermic-syringe shoot-up-the-internet-and-get-utopian model, the researchers above now have a more tempered approach. Perhaps a Zaller-esque return to massive effects will happen farther down the line in this silo of research—or maybe the massive effects of the internet will simply be felt in other venues. The IT revolution of work, manufacturing, and productivity seems like one place—also predicted by Castells—that this case could already be made today. Even IT is supplemental for now in the social sphere, the generations weened on it may make it more central. Time will tell.

1. In the Quan-Hasse piece, it is claimed that the respondents to the web-survey did not differ significantly from the GSS samples—and then its mentioned later that 23% of the respondents had a graduate degree. What’s going on here? Can web surveys ever be trusted anyways because of the self-selection? What if this survey had been administered on a wider array of sites and not just a high-falutin’ magazine’s page?

2. Imagine a world in which the internet preceded television. What kind of effect would the ‘net have had on society then? Would the interactive character of the net have mitigated the decline in activity that Putnam ascribes to TV or not?

3. Results in both the Robinson and Quan-Hasse pieces control for age, race, education etc etc. Yet, even after this, the results almost always seem to have an intuitive tint that could be imputed to age differences. Is it possible that generational factors are totally skewing these studies even after ‘holding them constant’?

Broadly put, this week’s readings center on changes in the shape of human relationships wrought by new media technologies—essentially television and the internet. First up, Putnam and the Mcpherson et al pieces build some historical context so that the character of social life in America can be understood. Putnam’s focus is upon social capital comprised by a broad array of (fairly) weak ties. The McPherson piece zeroes in more on strong ties that are marked by confidant-type relationships. In both articles, the story is the same: over time, social ties are declining in America. Basically, the big question is: why is social life changing in these ways? The other four pieces deal with one potential impetus for these changes: media, specifically internet, use. The findings are varied in this developing body of literature, but suggest that the explanations are not to be found in the technologies themselves but in how Americans use them.

It is tempting to look at changes in the media as the largest changes in American’s environment over that past century and, in following, attribute responsibility. Certainly, the decline in group membership highlighted by Putnam’s first table follows a pattern that clearly seems to relate to the adoption of TV and references the World Wars. While the influence of the World Wars is noted, Vietnam is never mentioned. Just as the World Wars brought wide cross-sections of American (men especially) together across lines of class and race, Vietnam bitterly divided Americans. The groups that Putnam follows were bolstered by relationships forged in tents along the western front—the animal groups, but also professional groups and others. For those that were returning from Vietnam, or those that did not participate, the context in America was simply not the same. This is one macro factor, but it seems like many others—like workforce mobility, national leadership and ideology, and the particular flows of immigration among others—must be considered and may explain as much or more of the changes noted by Putnam as TV does. In the McPherson article, both new media and structural changes to work and recreational lifestyles are mentioned in passing as reasons for the observed changes. Both of these articles make significant contributions to our knowledge of the world we live in; neither of them focus on explaining the phenomenon they describe.

The four pieces (two Pittsburgh, two Stanford) that describe the integration of the internet in Americans’ lives together paint an increasingly nuanced picture. After some fits and starts, the state of the literature currently suggests that the internet can be used to increase socializing and bolster feelings of well-being or may lead to isolation and depression. It comes down to who is using the technology, at what point in their life, and for what purpose. In the Stanford work, distinctions are drawn in both the kind of internet use and the kind of people using the internet. One trend stood out to me: the impact of the internet is centered on the youngest, most educated users. This has many implications. First, television use dominates the media life of older and less-educated respondents. Earlier work (like the Pittsburgh studies) may not have effectively controlled for some of these population differences. Second, those who are using the internet more are likely using it in large part for work—use that does not contribute positively to the social situation of the user. These slightly more nuanced findings suggest that internet use isn’t really the root variable. Instead, it is a proxy for macro-factors like a changing economic environment in which the population is increasingly stratified. Fitting these specific findings into the context created by Putnam and McPherson is challenging. If the overarching trends really are towards less social trust, less social capital, and less social support, and even if media use is only a small part of the story, can the productive elements of internet use be leveraged into reversing these trends?

1. Which macro-factors are most responsible for the changes in Americans’ social lives? How would these impacts be measured? Is explaining why important, or should our energies be focused on managing the situation at hand?

3. Will there be productive civic outcomes of online social-networking? Are there already examples of this?

Our back to the future week really begins with a slice of Howard Rheingold’s virtual community. Rheingold’s piece is in many ways a clarion call touting the legitimacy of online interaction, and the 4 other articles join in by addressing the nuances of the relationship between online and offline interaction in one way or another. Unfortunately, these articles (and my own mind) share a common—though forgivable—failure: limited imagination. Basically, it’s impossible to fully predict the future—and that’s the task at hand here. Reading these articles today, they seem bereft of (relevant) detail. In the time that’s passed, so many unexpected and creative events have happened online and offline that the primitive explorations are truly quaint. That said, the questions that they raise often remain unanswered.
Reading Rheingold’s piece on the WELL with Turner’s much later exploration of the historical roots of the service raises some interesting questions. For both Rheingold and many of the early adopters of the Whole Earth Catalog, a kind of physical detachment drove their need for a social/community outlet: Rheingold telecommuted & the hippies had deliberately removed themselves from society. Is the main effect of the internet (in a Meyrowitz, macro medium-effect sense) the elimination of detachment unless isolation is specifically sought? Meanwhile, for people who have strong social networks in real life, what role does online socializing play? Broadly put, are there people who actively choose to spurn a fulfilling real life to pursue online community? Or, is online community always a fall-back, a supplement? Certainly, people discuss the benefits of controlling the presentation of self via email or benefiting from its asynchronous nature… Our intuitive response might be yes, but I suspect that there are situations and conditions that are more effectively addressed by online interactions.
In the Wellman & Gulia (assist: Hampton) piece, 7 categories of inquiry regarding online community are explored. In reading this piece, I felt that most of my specific questions had been noted—but even 6-7 years after its publication I wonder if the context the article is situated in is too limited. Is it even possible to fully extricate and separate online vs. offline need fulfillment, strength of ties, etc. etc. etc. any more? This point is addressed discretely sporadically and at the end of the article, but I think that if the other specific points were to be addressed today, it would be more appropriate to have this in mind throughout.
I guess, in this same vein, the medium-theory approach advocated by Meyrowitz is appropriate and attractive here. To me, tracking down the exact strength of a particular online-tie overlooks the elephant in the room: that humans suddenly have generated an entirely new, additional realm of contact and communication. It’s not that new media supplant the existing modes of communication—though I reserve letter-writing for very particular occasions nowadays—its that the potential fabric of my daily interactions is enriched. It’s easier for me to talk, write, and grimace at my friends, family, and enemies. There’s a bunch of artful history in Meyrowitz's article—and very little that’s actually about new media except a claim that “everyone else, foreigner or family member, seems somewhat familiar – and somewhat strange.” To begin, I sort of disagree that my family seems more strange today than it would’ve 30 years ago because of technology. I also am very skeptical of his claim that people globally are more similar today than before. I see the superficial facts—similar media habits, jobs, clothing—but am not sure that people around the world weren’t actually fairly similar in other periods of history as well. They just might not have been aware of it…While I support the idea of taking a macro view of a medium, I feel very uncomfortable with seems like a swift leap to broad claims about the nature of civilization by Meyrowitz. Perhaps a book-length work by him would allay these qualms...